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CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR TO FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
The United States traditionally has neither encouraged nor dis-
couraged foreign direct investment.' In fact, the United States, as a
means of attaining its goal of maximizing freedom for trade, invest-
ment, and capital flows in the world economy, has long urged that
other countries adopt this policy of neutrality, the so-called open
door policy, towards foreign direct investment.2 In the early 1970's,
however, the United States discovered that the appeal of the open
door approach to foreign direct investment varied as economic con-
ditions changed. Before the 1970's, firms based in the United States
were rapidly expanding abroad, while foreign investment in the
United States remained inconsequential. 3 Changes in the interna-
tional economy triggered an influx of foreign investment into the
1. In 1977, the Economic Policy Group issued a policy statement for the Carter
Administration that upheld the long-standing United States commitment to an open
international economic system. The policy statement concluded that
"[t]he fundamental policy of the U.S. Government toward international invest-
ment is to neither promote nor discourage inward or outward investment flows
or activities ...
The Government, therefore, should normally avoid measures which would
give special incentives or disincentives to investment flows or activities and
should not normally intervene in the activities of individual companies regarding
international investment."
The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign
Investments in the United States: Hearings be/ore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer,
and Monetary Affairs of the House Com'm on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 3, 328 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings], reprinting Economic Policy
Group statement (July 6, 1977).
The policy statement also confirmed the commitment of the United States to neutral
treatment by stating that governments "'should not discriminate against established
firms on the basis of nationality or deprive such firms of their rights under international
law."' Id at 328, reprinting Economic Policy Group statement (July 6, 1977). See also
Niehuss, Foreign Investment in the United States: 4 Review of Government Policy, 16 VA.
J. INT'L L. 65, 67-69 (1975).
2. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 199 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten,
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
3. In 1975, Professor Benjamin Cohen testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce as follows:
This growth of American concern about foreign investment in our country is
not without its irony. For decades, when the United States was by far the largest
exporter of capital in the world, American officials and business leaders tradi-
tionally preached just the benefits of international investment, advocating full
reliance on the operation of free-market forces to determine the direction of
capital flows throughout the world. Little attention was paid or credence given
to concerns expressed in capital-importing countries about the potential costs, at
least to them, of foreign investments. ...
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United States,4 exciting public concern and precipitating two admin-
istrative policy reviews. These reviews reaffirmed the open door pol-
icy and called for more empirical data.5 United States policymakers
still maintain that the economic and political costs of foreign direct
investment are insufficient to warrant a change in United States
policy.6
Following the second policy review, conducted in 1975, foreign
direct investment in the United States expanded at an ever-increas-
ing rate.7 Because of this persistent increase, policy questions
regarding foreign direct investment have acquired new significance.
Foreign direct investment has become a permanent factor in the
economy of the United States, rather than a transient economic
phenomenon.
This Note examines the adequacy of the response of the United
States to foreign direct investment and concludes that the United
States should reconsider its present policy of neutrality. The present
indiscriminate treatment of foreign direct investments ignores the
complexity of the matter, and fails to take into account the costs of
foreign direct investment. In order to evaluate the available policy
choices, one must understand the impact of foreign direct investment
on the United States economy and upon the political scene. Accord-
ingly, this Note first examines the reasons for foreign direct invest-
ment and its economic and political effects.
This Note then considers two approaches to foreign direct
investment. House bill 77508 presents one version of the first
approach. The bill sought to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
• . . Yet now that the shoe is on the other foot, and it is we who are increas-
ingly the host of international investment flows, many Americans would have us
do what previously this country criticized others for doing.
Foreign Investment Legislation: Hearings on S. 329, S. 995, S. 1303, and Amendment No.
393 Before the Subcoma on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-42 (1975) (testimony of Professor Benjamin J.
Cohen) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings], reprinted in 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt.
3, at 17. See H. STEPHENSON, THE COMING CLASH 12 (1972).
4. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
7. At the end of 1975, foreign direct investment in the United States amounted to
$27,662 million. Chung & Fouch, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1977,
SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1978, at 39, 46. This amount represented approximately a
10% increase over the previous year. Foreign direct investment rose approximately 23%
to a total of $52,260 million by the end of the year. Chung & Fouch, Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States in 1979, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1980, at 38, 38.
Thus, both the rate of growth and the total amount of foreign direct investment nearly
doubled within this four-year period.
8. H.R. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill has now died from inattention.
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19349 to create reciprocal limitations on foreign investment. Specifi-
cally, the bill would have made it unlawful for a foreign corporation
to acquire the beneficial ownership of equity securities, unless the
laws and regulations of the incorporating country had been no more
restrictive than United States Federal law with respect to like invest-
ments by United States corporations in the incorporating country.10
Proponents of the bill apparently believed that its enactment would
have reduced the barriers to foreign direct investment that United
States investors encountered abroad by inducing foreign nations to
reduce the restrictions they placed on inflows of investment capital
in order to secure investment privileges for their nationals in the
United States.' Moreover, the proposed statute would have pre-
vented those countries unwilling to admit United States investors on
terms equivalent to those offered by the United States from taking
advantage of the lenient open door policy.12
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j-77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78d, 78e-781, 78m-78o, 78o-3 to
78hh, 78ii-78jj (1976), amendedby 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(15), 77c(a)(2), (6)-(7), (9)-(10), (b),
77(d)(6), 77s(c), 78c(a)(12), (40), 78k(a)(3), 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78o(d), 78u(g), 78ff
(Supp. IV 1980).
10. The bill provided in full as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(d)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new paragraph:
"(7) It shall be unlawful for any person incorporated in a foreign country to
acquire, directly or indirectly, the beneficial ownership of equity securities of the
type and in the amount described in paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the
laws and regulations of the country in which such person is incorporated are no
more restrictive than the provisions of this title and other Federal law with
respect to the acquisition, by a person incorporated in a State of the United
States, of a like amount of equity securities issued by a person incorporated in
such foreign country. The President may waive the application of this paragraph
in any case in which he determines such waiver is required by a national emer-
gency.".
H.R. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
11. Apart from other doubts concerning the success of this quid pro quo approach in
bringing about the desired reduction in other nations' restrictions on foreign direct
investment, see infra text accompanying notes 123-24, the limited scope of House Report
7750 would have handicapped the effectiveness of the proposed statute. The proposed
statute apparently would have applied only to the acquisition of the beneficial ownership
of equity securities by foreign corporations. See supra note 10. Moreover, the proposed
statute would have tested a corporate investor's eligibility only by examining the laws
and regulations of the incorporating nation. Id The nationality of a corporation's
owners, however, often differs from the nationality of the corporation itself. Conse-
quently, foreigners might have avoided the apparent intent of the proposed statute by
shopping for an incorporating country that subscribes to an open door policy concerning
foreign direct investment. This Note concerns not so much the particular provisions of
House bill 7750, however, as the bill's general quid pro quo approach to foreign direct
investment.
12. This is the standard rationale for reciprocal limitations. For a discussion of the
merits of reciprocal limitations on foreign direct investment, see D.F. LAMONT, F REIGN
STATE ENTmERu'Sas 23-25, 43-47, 193-202 (1979); see also 1979 Hearings, supra note I,
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The second approach to foreign direct investment is a case by
case screening procedure. It is the thesis of this Note that a screening
procedure deserves consideration as a policy device that will permit
the United States to regulate future foreign direct investment in
accord with its national interests, without significantly hampering
the international flow of investment capital.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
At the end of 1979, the aggregate of foreign direct investment 13
in the United States was $52,260 million.14 This represented a
twenty-three percent increase over the previous year, following a
similar increase in 1978.15 These increases were more than double
the average accretions in the years 1975 to 1977,16 and the pace of
growth in foreign direct investment shows no signs of slackening.
17
As with domestic investors, the prospect of economic gain is the
pt. 3, at 21-30 (testimony of Douglas F. Lamont, Dean, Walter E. Heller School of Busi-
ness Administration, Roosevelt University).
13. The conventional definition of foreign direct investment is the ownership of a
partial or total controlling interest in an enterprise. This definition distinguishes a direct
investment from an indirect or portfolio investment, Ze., an investment that does not
provide the investor with operating control of the enterprise involved. Note, U.. Regu-
lation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current Developments and the Congressional
Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 613-15 (1975). For instance, the International Invest-
ment Survey Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976), amended by 22 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3108 (West 1979), andby 22 U.S.C. §§ 3103(a)(3), (d), 3107(b), 3108 (Supp. III 1979),
defines direct investment as "the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one per-
son of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an incorporated business enter-
prise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated business enterprise." 22 U.S.C.
§ 3102(10) (1976). The Act defines portfolio investment as "any international investment
which is not direct investment." Id § 1302(11). The Act's definition of direct investment
principally concerns the ownership or control of profitmaking organizations, but also
covers the ownership of real estate. Id § 3102(6).
Of course, the quality of being foreign is the second major part of any definition of
foreign direct investment. Any law on foreign direct investment must include some stan-
dard by which to test the foreignness of the investment capital or the investor or both. In
the case of foreign corporate investment and investors, any such standard is often elusive
and problematic. See generally Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises,
52 COLuM. L. REV. 983 (1952); Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Deinitional Questions on
Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprises, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1961).
Finally, because it suggests only 'capital movements for the purpose of establishing
lasting economic relations, the word investment may supply some substantive content to
the definition of foreign direct investment. See, e.g., OROANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES, REvIEW OF THE 1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS, 45 n. 7
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 OECD REVIEW].
14. Chung & Fouch (Aug. 1980), supra note 7, at 38.
15. See supra note 7.
16. See Chung & Fouch (Aug. 1978), supra note 7, at 46; Chung & Fouch (Aug.
1980), supra note 7, at 38.
17. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1978, at 79, 79.
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foreign investor's primary motivation. 8 Commentators generally
attribute the currently favorable foreign investment climate in the
United States to six factors: first, the depreciation of the United
States dollar in foreign exchange markets; second, and closely
related, the depressed value of the United States stock and real estate
markets; third, the economic and political stability of the United
States; fourth, the size and homogeneity of many markets within the
United States; fifth, possible access to United States technological
innovations; and sixth, the availability of raw materials and scarce
natural resources.' 9 In addition, fear of future protectionism and
18. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 8 (testimony of Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan).
The pertinence of this proposition for most foreign investors was never in dispute. In the
mid-1970's, however, many members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) began making large-scale-investments in the United States. Many Ameri-
cans feared that political rather than economic goals motivated these government-
controlled investments. See Note, supra note 13, at 611-13, 618, 621-26, 629, 633-47.
Such fears notwithstanding, OPEC governments generally behave like other large insti-
tutional investors. Indeed, sophisticated and conservative Western investment advisers
manage the vast bulk of OPEC government funds and exercise considerable discretion
over their clients' accounts. Niehuss, supra note 1, at 99-102.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1216]; Chung & Fouch, (Aug. 1980), supra note 7, at 40-41.
The depreciation of the dollar makes investment in the United States cheaper in terms
of foreign currency and so increases the purchasing power of foreign investors. The
proliferation of dollars abroad creates additional investment incentive. H.R. REP. No.
1216, supra, at 10. The Comptroller of the Currency recently testified: "[T]he result of
the U.S. international account deficit position is to place excess dollars in the hands of
foreigners, virtually inviting them to invest in the United States." 1979 Hearings, supra
note I, pt. 4, at 65 (testimony of John G. Heiman, Comptroller of the Currency).
Because of the depressed value of the United States stock market, many major compa-
nies have been selling at below net asset value. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra, at 10. For a
foreign investor, "US common stocks now look the cheapest as well as the fastest way to
a stake in America." Foreign Investment in the USA, 1978 MULTINATIONAL Bus. 12, 15.
But cf. Address by Dieter zur Loye, Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operat-
ing Officer of the American Hoechst Corporation, Socidt6 de Chimie, American Chapter,
New York, New York (May 23, 1980),printed in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, July 15,
1980, at 599, 599-601. (Mr. zur Loye, a West German corporate executive, takes the
position that bargain prices are not always the primary motivation for European invest-
ment in United States firms. He maintains that, instead, many foreign investors pay high
prices for United States acquisitions, because it is often necessary in terms of interna-
tional corporate strategy to establish a position in the United States market.)
Foreign investors perceive the United States as a politically stable investment environ-
ment and relatively free from governmental regulatory controls on the economy. Con-
cerned by an apparent long-run trend toward socialism in many parts of the world, many
investors regard the United States as the last bastion of capitalism. U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 13, 1978, at 79, 79. United States attractions also include a large, homogene-
ous market united by a common language and common laws. The sheer size of the
United States market presents greater potential for future growth and profits than its
smaller European counterparts. Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Moreover, many
firms believe that successful competition within the United States is a prerequisite to
developing an internationally competitive position. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19,-
at 9.
By making investments in the United States, foreign firms may acquire access to
United States technological innovations, which in turn may be transferred to a parent
firm abroad. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 48-57 (testimony of Eldon E. Sweezy).
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stricter trade restrictions by the United States government has stimu-
lated foreign direct investment in the United States.20
The effects of foreign direct investment on the economy of the
United States are too far-reaching to estimate with accuracy. It is
apparent, however, that foreign direct investment does not only pro-
duce benefits. In gauging the impact and desirability of foreign
direct investment, United States policymakers should concentrate on
its effect on the United States balance of payments.2 1 Proponents of
the policy of neutrality argue that foreign direct investment holds
down the balance of payments deficit and bolsters the international
value of the United States dollar by increasing capital flows into the
United States. 22 This, however, is not necessarily true.
Greater foreign direct investment does not necessarily signal the
inflow of capital from abroad. 23 Many foreign investors borrow
between sixty and eighty percent of their investment funds from the
United States credit market.24 By augmenting the demand for
domestic funds, these foreign investors exert an upward pressure on
United States interest rates.25
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Similarly, foreign investors may seek a
guaranteed source of raw materials or natural resources. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt.
I, at 9 (testimony of Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan).
20. Chung & Fouch (Aug. 1980), supra note 7, at 41.
21. As a general proposition, foreign direct investment will benefit the United States
balance of payments if it generates greater demand for dollars abroad, and thereby
causes the value of the dollar to appreciate-or to depreciate less rapidly. If the invest-
ment results in a net outflow of dollars, the supply of dollars abroad will increase and
thereby cause their value to fall. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 213.
22. For an expression of this point of view, see 1979 Hearings, supra note I, pt. 2, at
198-204 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs,
U.S. Department of the Treasury).
23. In 1976, the Department of Commerce reported that, although capital inflows
were significant in 1974, banks and other sources in the United States were the largest
suppliers of capital for foreign-owned firms in the United States. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 235-36 (1976). In 1978, a
Chase Manhattan Bank study noted that foreign subsidiaries in the United States were
financed primarily by United States commercial banks. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (1978).
24. Id The experience of United States firms that invest abroad indicates that
domestic credit markets are commonly the source of funds for foreign direct investment.
For example, a study of the activities of multinational corporations in Brazil and Mexico
made this finding:
Of the net sources of funds used by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in the 1958-
68 period, only 20 percent represented new capital inflows from the parent....
(This includes funds borrowed internationally by the U.S. parent and then
invested in the foreign affiliate.) The remaining 80 percent was produced inter-
nally by the subsidiary itself or borrowed locally ....
R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND
MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC POWER, REPORT
TO THE SUBCOMM. ON MULTINAT'L CORPS. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 16 (Comm. Print 1975).
25. Domestic borrowing by foreign-owned firms has the same effect on the United
States credit market as does domestic borrowing by United States firms: the demand for
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Although highly leveraged 26 foreign investments in the United
States may not initially harm the United States balance of payments,
the long-term repatriation 27 of profits earned on such investments
may ultimately produce a net outflow of capital.28 In the late 1960's,
when they faced domestic opposition to large scale exportation of
investment capital,29 firms based in the United States used this possi-
bility to justify outflows of investment capital. United States corpo-
rations maintained that they repatriated dividends and profits from
their foreign investments in amounts greater than the capital out-
flows to host countries.30 As one American businessman stated: "'It
is simply a matter of economics that foreign investments ultimately
return a lot more dollars than they siphon off.' ,,31 The profits gener-
ated by foreign direct investment in the United States may follow a
similar course and flow back to the investors' home countries.
Foreign direct investment indirectly affects the United States
balance of payments through its impact on United States trade
accounts. If foreign direct investment displaces imports-e.g, when
an investment is responsible for the domestic manufacture of a pre-
funds increases, and to the extent that money markets become tighter, interest rates tend
to rise. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 214.
26. A leveraged investment is an investment that the investor finances in part by
debt. Such an investor usually pays for his purchase with a small capital outlay and a
large percentage of borrowed funds. The investor is thus able to earn a relatively high
rate of return while putting at risk a relatively small amount of his own capital.
27. The term repatriation generally refers to the return of foreign investment capital,
or profits or other income derived from it, to the country from which it originally came.
At a minimum, the term refers to the removal of such money from the country where it
was invested.
28. The General Accounting Office recently noted:
'Theoretically, if investment capital comes from abroad, the host country has an
immediate short-term benefit from the balance-of-payments standpoint. How-
ever, as profits and interest are repatriated to the home country and exceed
vested capital, the balance-of-payments effects ultimately become adverse. The
United States, according to this theory, thus stands to face future balance-of-
payments problems."
H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 15, quoting GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERG-
ING CONCERNS OVER FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1975). See also
1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 142 (testimony of Professor Robert G. Hawkins).
As an example, assume that a foreign investor acquires a United States corporation for
$10 million, paying $2 million in cash and borrowing the remainder from a United States
bank. If this investor repatriates $4 million of profits from the investment, the United
States will experience a net outflow of $2 million-not accounting for the time value of
money-and a corresponding intertemporal debit in its balance of payments.
29. See U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss. 21-23 (Comm. Print 1973).
30. See id at 29-30.
The term home country refers to the country from which the foreign investor comes,
and the term host country refers to the state where the foreign investor makes an
investment.
31. R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, supra note 24, at 12, quoting Eugene Latham,
president of Mexletter Investment.
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viously imported good-the trade accounts and the balance of pay-
ments will improve.32 Conversely, an affiliate in the United States
may harm the trade accounts and balance of payments by serving as
a sales outlet for a foreign parent, or by importing component parts
for assembly in the United States.33 The experience of the foreign
affiliates of United States firms also illustrates this point.3 4 A 1973
report by the United States Tariff Commission examined the impact
of the foreign investments of multinational corporations on the econ-
omies of home and host countries.35 It stated that "the appropriate
conclusion for the seven countries surveyed is that the MNCs [mul-
tinational corporations], in their dealings with their parent country,
exerted a large and growing negative or adverse influence on host-
country balances of payments.13 6
Americans generally think that foreign direct investment creates
new manufacturing facilities, such as the Honda Motor Company's
proposed construction of an automobile assembly plant in Ohio.37
Most foreign direct investment, however, involves the acquisition of
healthy, established businesses.38 In 1979, the acquisition of estab-
lished firms consumed ninety-three percent of the total foreign
investment expended in the United States.39 Because they are buy-
ing into a new business environment, foreign investors prefer invest-
ments with a proven record of performance. 40 The purchase of a
healthy United States business can provide a foreign investor with
immediate access to United States marketing, manufacturing, and
research facilities that would have been costly and time consuming
to develop.41
32. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 213.
33. Id
34. A study conducted by the Department of Commerce in 1972 indicated that
United States firms maintaining affiliates abroad were responsible for 25% of all United
States exports. The export earnings of United States manufacturers increased because of
shipments of goods, including manufacturing components, to affiliates in countries where
no market for these United States goods previously existed. H.R. RP. No. 1216, supra
note 19, at 15-16. See also R. NEwFARMER & W. MUELLER, supra note 24, at 12. If this
trend reverses, imports into the United States will increase as a result of foreign direct
investment, and the balance of payments and trade accounts will suffer.
35. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, supra note 29, at 78.
36. Id at 30.
37. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 16.
39. Int'l Inv. Div., U.S. Business EnterprisesAcquired or Established by Foreign Direct
Investors in 1979, SuRv. CUtmNT Bus., Jan. 1981, at 28, 36.
40. John L. Gornall, an attorney who represents many foreign investors, recently
testified: "I find that foreign investors do not buy anything but the best properties avail-
able to them." 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 20. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 21,
1979, at 1, col. 2.41. Address by Dieter zure Loye, supra note 19, printed in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY, July 15, 1980, at 599, 600-01; Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1981, at 40, 41; U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1978, at 79, 80.
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If it establishes new facilities, foreign direct investment offers
potential benefits for the economy of the United States. Although
the net consequence of this kind of investment may prove harmful as
well, it does have the potential for generating capital inflows, creat-
ing new jobs, and improving the tax base for the United States. In
contrast, acquisitions by foreign investors are not likely to give rise
to any of these benefits. 42
Acquisitions by foreign investors may serve as a vehicle for
obtaining technological innovations.43 An affiliate in the United
States may transfer such information to its foreign parent and
thereby reduce the competitiveness of the United States overseas.44
A different and more subtle shift in competitive advantage occurs
when a foreign investor enters a United States market without hav-
ing its United States affiliate participate in product development. 45
With reference to foreign direct investment in Canada, the Cana-
dian-American Committee46 observed that the Canadian affiliates of
foreign firms "do not do as much research or as sophisticated
research as their parent companies abroad in most cases."'47 Thus,
42. The benefits derived from a new plant may be offset if the investor repatriates the
profits or imports components for assembly in the United States. Initially, however, such
investment has potential for benefitting the United States. Acquisitions by foreign firms
stand in contrast: "The major exception, in my view, to the general attitude of laissez
faire [toward foreign direct investment] may be in instances of foreign takeovers of U.S.
firms. In instances of takeovers, there is. . . a reasonable chance of economic cost to the
economy.. . ..." 1979 Hearings, supra note I, pt. 1, at 147 (testimony of Professor Rob-
ert G. Hawkins).
43. Id at 142 ("In takeovers of U.S. companies.. . the foreign firm may be moti-
vated by research facilities or technology owned by the U.S. firm or available through
production facilities in the United States."); U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1978, at
79, 80; see, e.g., Bus. WK., May 5, 1980, at 54, 54; id, Oct. 22, 1979, at 86, 86.
44. Such a transfer took place after Fujitsu, a large Japanese firm, invested in the
Amdahl Corporation, a domestic computer manufacturer. Through its investment,
Fujitsu obtained access to a new design for a computer system. The United States suf-
fered a corresponding loss of competitive advantage in this field in the international mar-
ket. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 84, 86, reprinting Letter from Professor Stefan
H. Robock to Congressman Benjamin S. Rasenthal (Oct. 12, 1979); 9 U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 23, at app. 0, at 0-34 to -35 (1976).
Most observers appear to agree that foreign direct investment only occasionally gener-
ates technology transfers to foreign countries. See, e.g., id app. 0, at 0-60. However, this
conclusion does not remove all cause for concern. The participants in a seminar on this
topic, conducted by the Department of Commerce in 1976, noted that the acquisition of
United States technology may increasingly be a factor in foreign direct investment.
"Already some foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms reflect the critical need to move fast in
new areas of technology. Digital watches provide a good example, because American
technology is way ahead in this field and foreigners (e.g., the Japanese) can hardy hope
to catch up by starting from scratch." Id app. 0, at 0-33.
45. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 52 (testimony of Eldon E. Sweezy).
46. The Canadian-American Committee draws its members from both Canada and
the United States and examines problems arising from the growing interdependence of
the two countries. A.E. SAFARIAN, THE PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN-OWNED FIRMs IN
CANADA iii (1969).
47. Id at 53; see generally id at 41-56.
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even if foreign direct investment rarely generates technology trans-
fers to foreign countries, it may shift the technology base, the
dynamic component of economic growth, outside the United States.
For many foreign investors, the United States is a stable source
of abundant natural resources.48 In 1975, the General Accounting
Office reported: "'Faced with today's world shortages. . . , some
[foreign] investors [in the United States] are doubtlessly seeking to
insure their home countries' access to sources of food, energy, and
other scarce commodities.' 49 In contrast to many nations, 50 the
United States imposes few restrictions on foreign direct investment
in these sectors of the economy. Given the exhaustible nature of
many of these resources, however, this policy seems at odds with
long range United States economic interests.5'
The undesirable political effects of foreign direct investment
stem simply from the foreignness of the investor. Such companies
and individuals operate under the jurisdiction of more than one
nation-state. The large scale presence of foreign investors may
diminish national autonomy. As foreign investors wield greater
influence within the United States economy, the United States Gov-
ernment may gradually surrender some of its ability to shape its own
social, economic, and political policies. 52
Public concern over foreign direct investment derives in part
from the intuition that key domestic industries should remain in the
hands of nationals.53 Although the United States restricts foreign
direct investment in some key sectors of the economy, such as
domestic broadcasting, internal air transport, and nuclear energy
48. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 9 (testimony of Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan);
see generally Bus. WK., July 9, 1979, at 50. In 1974, for example, a subsidiary of Veba, a
West German enterprise, purchased coal mines in West Virginia for $24 million. The
company ships coal from these mines to Europe to fuel West Germany's electrical gener-
ators. D.F. LAMONT, supra note 12, at 41, 155-56 (1979).49. H.R. Rni'. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 18 (emphasis omitted) quoting GEN.
ACCOUNTING OfFicE, supra note 28, at 34.
50. King, Foreign Restrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 32
(1973). For summaries of the policies of other major industrialized nations on foreign
investment, including their policies on foreign investment in natural resources and raw
materials, see 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, app. N.
51. Even if the need for some of these restrictions is presently remote, Professor
Lamont argues that the United States only encourages more Western European and Jap-
anese dependence on United States resources by delaying their imposition. Conse-
quently, when the need for such restrictions becomes acute, the United States will
encounter foreign opposition to their imposition. D.F. LAMoNT, supra note 12, at 155.
52. 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 141-45 (testimony of Professor Benjamin J.
Cohen), reprinted in 1979 Hearings, supra note I, pt. 3, at 17, 17-19; Ellis, United States
Multinational Corporations: The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on United States
Foreign Relations, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1973).
53. Ellis, supra note 52, at 9-10.
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production,5 4 these regulations may be too narrow to effectively pro-
tect the interests of the United States.55
Investment activities bring the foreign investor partially under
the dominion of United States law.5 6 Nevertheless, foreign investors
are capable of circumventing or ignoring national policies regarding
matters such as employment, prices, regional development, market
competition, research and development, and foreign trade.5 7 More-
over, although some foreign investors acquire a global economic and
commercial perspective, most retain a national political outlook.5 8
There is often a close relationship between a foreign investor and the
home government.59 Such an investor may feel compelled to
observe the policies of the home government, even when they clash
with the objectives of the host government.60
II. UNITED STATES POLICY ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
Throughout the postwar era, the United States has energetically
promoted an international economic order based on market compe-
tition.6 1 Towards that end, the United States has supported the
54. Federal law controls foreign investment in, among others, the following areas:
aviation, coastal shipping, salvage, the transfer of ships, fishing, domestic radio and tele-
vision communications, telegraph companies, nuclear energy operations, the purchasing
or leasing of public lands and of pipelines and mineral rights on government property,
and the directorships of national banks. For specific citations and a discussion, see
Niehuss, supra note 1, at 82-87.
55. Professor Benjamin Cohen has expressed this view: "[T]hese regulations
[restricting foreign direct investment in certain areas] may be far less adequate that [sic]
administration spokesmen would have us believe. My reason for suggesting this is sim-
ply that the interpretation of national security embodied in these regulations is simply
too narrow to be effective." 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 143, reprinted in 1979 Hear-
ings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 17, 18.
56. Enactments such as the National Labor Relations Act, the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, and the Internal Revenue Code, as well as the common law of torts, contracts, and
corportions, may all have some application to foreign investors. Problems of jurisdiction
and service of process, however, may present obstacles to enforcement. In addition, the
substantive scope of United States law does not respond directly to the chief fears raised
by foreign investment. For example, no law requires an investor to maintain his invest-
ment, and no law limits the size or growth of foreign-held companies. For a discussion
of this problem, see Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwa-
ter Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments, 72- MicH. L. Rv. 551, 556-61 (1974).
57. 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 142 (testimony of Professor Benjamin J. Cohen),
reprinted in 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 17, 18. See also supra 21-36 and accom-
panying text.
58. 1975 Hearings, supra note 3, at 143 (testimony of Professor Benjamin J. Cohen),
reprinted in 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, at 17, 18.
59. Indeed, foreign governments own 59 of the 500 largest industrial corporations
outside the United States. D.F. LAMONT, supra note 12, at 30. Nearly all of these firms
occupy competitive positions, within their respective industries, in the United States. Id
60. A.E. SAFARIAN, supra note 46, at 107.
61. Eg., 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 199 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten,
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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unimpeded movement of investment capital among nations. 62 This
open door policy harmonized well with the United States' position as
the world's largest exporter of investment capital with little foreign
direct investment at home. United States policymakers regarded
host countries' resistance to the infusion of United States investment
capital as either unfriendly or unsophisticated. 63
In the early 1970's, the attitude of the United States public
toward foreign direct investment underwent a radical transforma-
tion. Two devaluations of the dollar in quick succession, along with
a sudden upsurge in foreign direct investment from Western Europe
and Japan, excited public concern.64 In 1973, the Nixon Administra-
tion conducted a review of the policy of the United States toward
foreign direct investment.65 Even though the survey demonstrated
the United States Government's inability to assess the magnitude
and significance of foreign investment in the United States, 66 the
study reaffirmed existing policy.67 Congress devised the Foreign
62. For example, the United States participated in the drafting of the 1961 Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements for the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD). OECD, THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT app. IV (1963). Since its promulgation, the United States has
urged other nations to remove their reservations and derogations under the Code.
Niehuss, supra note 1, at 68.
63. "Host-country regulations to restrict new investments or the activities of already
existing investments were greeted with criticism in this country as being irrational or
unfriendly-or both; some were even threatened with retaliation." 1975 Hearings, supra
note 3, at 142 (testimony of Professor Benjamin J. Cohen), reprinted in 1979 Hearings,
note 1, pt. 3, at 17, 17.
64. Foreign direct investment in the United States rose from $20.6 billion in 1973 to
$25.1 billion in 1974, an increase of 21.8%. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 209. For
a discussion of other economic and political factors contributing to United States public
concern over foreign direct investment, see 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. I at 10-11
(testimony of Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan); COMM. TO STUDY FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S.,
SECTION OF CORP., BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, A GUIDE TO FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 11-12 (1979).
65. U.S. PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 43
(1975). The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) conducted the survey, as
part of its overall review of the United States' international investment policy, with the
assistance of the Interagency Task Force on Foreign Investment in the United States.
Niehuss, supra note I, at 71-72.
66. The CIEP found that the system for collecting data on foreign investment in the
United States was inadequate. U.S. PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT 65 (1974). A subsequent Department of Commerce study confirmed this
state of affairs. The Department of Commerce found that over 20 Federal agencies col-
lected data on foreign investment, using 140 report forms. The collection and disclosure
of this data was not systematic or standardized. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note
23, at 222-23. The degree of ownership necessary before an agency required a foreign
investor to submit a form varied from 1% to 50%. Id at 227; cf. 1979 Hearings, supra
note 1, pt. 3, at 9 (testimony of Professor William S. Barnes) (comparison to information
gathering of other countries).
67. The CIEP concluded that the open door policy should continue in force and that
the Administration should oppose any Congressional attempt to impose new restrictions.
U.S. PRESIDENT, supra note 66, at 65. The CIEP reported that foreign investment was
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Investment Study Act of 197468 to remedy the problem of insufficient
information. That Act created a mechanism to monitor and study
all forms of foreign investment in the United States.69
Public interest in foreign direct investment subsided briefly until
the oil embargo. The emergence of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a major force in the the world econ-
omy triggered renewed interest.70 Concern over the substantial dol-
lar holdings of the OPEC nations, and their capacity to invest in the
United States, led to the 1975 policy review.71 This study confirmed
the conclusions of the 1973 policy review.72
In their reports pursuant to the Foreign Investment Study Act of
1974,73 neither the Department of Commerce nor the Department of
the Treaury expressed alarm over the growth of foreign investment
in the United States, and neither recommended any departure from
the traditional open door policy of the United States.74 Both, how-
not a significant factor when compared to the overall size of the United States economy,
id at 59, 62, and that there was no evidence of foreign control in any critical sector.
Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomn on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1974) (state-
ment of Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]. There was a sharp increase in foreign investment in
1973, but the data indicated that these investment flows were subject to fluctuation from
year to year. Id at 80, 86 (testimony and statement of Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the
President for International Economic Affairs). The CIEP concluded that the figures of
one year alone cannot serve as the basis for any dramatic policy change. Id
68. Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (noted at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976)).
69. The Act directed the Departments of Treasury and Commerce to undertake three
major activities: first, a survey of the nature, scope, and magnitude of foreign investment
in the United States, id §§ 2, 4(1), 5(1), 6(1); second, analysis of a number of matters
concerning foreign investment, id §§ 5(2)-(12), 6(2)-(8); and third, a study of the ade-
quacy of reporting and disclosure requirements, accompanied by recommendations for
improvements in the data-collecting process, id §§ 5(11), 5(13), 6(9)-(10).
70. Niehuss, supra note 1, at 66.
71. Foreign Investment Act of 1975" Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21, 23-24 (1975) (testimony of Jack F. Bennett, Under Secretary for Monetary
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
72. Four major conclusions emerged. First, there was no need for any new legisla-
tion restricting foreign investment. Id at 22. Second, there was a possible need for legis-
lation devised to reveal the beneficial owner standing behind both foreign and domestic
investments made in nominees' names. Id Third, there was a need to create a new
interagency committee to supplement existing administration action. Id Fourth, the
United States Government would seek advance consultation with principal foreign gov-
ernmental investors concerning major direct investments in the United States. Id The
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States later became the proposed inter-
agency committee. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. §§ 990-92 (1971-1975 Compila-
tion), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. §§ 131-35 (1980 Compilation),
reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b app. at 1468-69 (Supp. IV 1980).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FOR-
EIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
74. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, at 233-40; 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 73, at 1-5.
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ever, recommended improved information gathering.75 Accordingly,
Congress enacted the International Investment Survey Act of 197676
"to provide clear and unambiguous authority for the President to
collect information on international investment and to provide anal-
yses of such information to the Congress, the executive agencies, and
the general public."'77
Bolstered by the findings of the two policy reviews and the
reports under the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, United
States officials continue to adhere to the open door policy. This pol-
icy rests on the premise that the unhindered operation of competitive
market forces brings about the most efficient allocation of scarce
resources in the world economy.78 This theory holds that an unin-
hibited international market for capital improves employment levels
and standards of living, resulting in a net economic benefit for both
sending and receiving countries. 79 One advocate of the current pol-
icy summarized the United States' approach as follows: "So long as
it [foreign direct investment] takes place in response to market
forces, we welcome it.'"80 Consequently, the United States does not
75. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, at 241; 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS-
URY, supra note 73, at 55-61.
76. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976), amendedby 22 U.S.C.A. § 3108 (West 1979), and
by §§ 3103(a)(3), (d), 3107(b), 3108 (Supp. III 1979). The 1976 Act authorizes the Presi-
dent to conduct, "to the extent he deems necessary and feasible," a regular data collec-
tion program on foreign direct and portfolio investment in the United States. Id
§ 3103(a). The Act also requires the President to make comprehensive benchmark
surveys every five years. Id § 3103(b)-(c).
77. Id § 3101(b).
78. For instance, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury testified in 1975 as follows:
U.S. policy with respect to international investment has generally been based
on the premise that we should rely on the private market as the most efficient
means to determine the allocation and use of capital in the international
economy.
Accordingly, our basic policy toward foreign investment in the United States
has reflected an. "open door" approach.
Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomtm. on Int'l Trade,
Investment and Monetary Policy ofthe House Comm on Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1975) (testimony of Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on Foreign Investment], reprinted in 1979
Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 66, 80 (annex to statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
79. The world and U.S. economies have benefited greatly from the expansion of
world trade and capital flows, in terms of increases in employment and standards
of living far greater than would have been possible if we and other nations had
raised, rather than lowered, the barriers to international trade and payments.
1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 203 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secre-
tary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury). Others maintain that
unrestricted foreign direct investment also promotes greater competition, higher wages,
additional tax revenues, and an overall increase in production. 1974 Hearings, supra
note 67, at 299, 349-52 (report prepared for use by CIEP).
80. 1979 Hearings, supra note I, pt. 2 at 204 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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presently consider whether a particular investment will generate net
benefits or net harm.8 1 These United States policymakers maintain
that the free international exchange of investment capital will pro-
duce, on the whole, an improvement in the economic welfare of the
world.82 This view, however, ignores the fact that this free exchange
of investment capital may not distribute the costs and benefits of a
foreign direct investment equitably between the home and host
countries. 83 The question remains as to whether the United States
can forge a policy that will reap an adequate share of the benefits
associated with foreign direct investment, without assuming a dis-
proportionate share of the harmful consequences.
The present policy does not adequately recognize or respond to
the costs of foreign direct investment.84 Moreover, this passive pol-
icy fails to distinguish between beneficial investments, such as new
plant construction financed by investment capital inflows, and possi-
bly harmful investments, such as takeovers. Detrimental invest-
ments encounter no obstacles, while clearly beneficial projects meet
with indifference.85
81. The United States "offer[s] foreigners no special incentives to invest here and,
with a few internationally recognized exceptions, ha[s] imposed no special barriers."
Hearing on Foreign Investment, supra note 78, at 155 (testimony of Gerald L. Parsky,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 66,
80 (annex to statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs,
U.S. Department of the Treasury).
82. See supra note 79.
83. On the distinction between the efficient allocation of scarce resources and the
distribution of goods and services, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 9-11 (3d ed. 1979). Distribution is an ethical matter for which the science
of economics can give no guidance. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 635 (9th ed. 1973).
84. Nor does it respond to the public concern over this issue. "While foreign direct
investments always have existed in the United States, their dramatic increase in the early
1970's was noticed more readily and was of more concern to a wider number of parties in
this country than ever before." 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 10 (testimony of
Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan). The following passage illustrates the tenor of this concern:
As a recently retired Foreign Service Officer, I have lived in several countries
where a heavy and rapid infusion of foreign capital has had a negative effect
when allowed to dominate especially sensitive sectors of the economy (e.g.
banks, public utilities) ....
Someone obviously has to point out to big business and to big government that
investment when carried to an extreme by foreigners is not an unmitigated
benefit....
It is no longer sufficient for business and government to declare that such
investment in America is a sign of euphoric confidence in our country. Rather, it
is a sign that certain astute foreigners can recognize the bargains which can be
picked up at a bankruptcy auction.
1979 Hearings, supra note 1, at 116, 116, reprinting Letter from Walter M. Bastian, Jr., to
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (July 28, 1979).
85. Many of the United States' trading partners have not hesitated to establish con-
trols on foreign investment. For a description of Canadian and Mexican restrictions, see
Barnes, Foreign Investment in Canada and Mexico: An Agendafor Host Country Screen-
ing, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 1 (1977). For a discussion of French and West German
controls, see Note, supra note 56, at 580-84. For a summary and discussion of Latin
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Supporters of the open door policy argue that imposing restric-
tions on foreign direct investment would violate treaty obligations of
the United States. The United States has entered treaties of friend-
ship, commerce, and navigation with over forty countries.8 6 The
terms of most of these treaties will easily accommodate restrictions
on foreign direct investment.87 The remainder generally contain suf-
ficient flexibility to permit the United States to enact some restric-
tions on inflows of investment capital.88
Proponents of the existing policy also maintain that the United
States' postwar effort to establish an international free market will
collapse if the United States appears to hedge on this commitment in
any respect.89 This argument overstates the significance of United
States policy. The United States' example does not establish pat-
American controls, see PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY OF LATIN-AMERICAN LEGISLATION ON THE REGULATION AND CONTROL
OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1975).
86. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 38.
87. Approximately one-half of the less restrictive treaties promise most-favored-
nation treatment only with regard to the organization of companies, the acquisition of
shares, and the holding of executive positions. Note, supra note 56, at 575-76. The other
half date from an earlier period, before the United States began to promote direct invest-
ment abroad. These earlier treaties do not deal explicitly with investment activity and
merely impose a most-favored-nation commitment in matters of commerce. The term
commerce is nowhere defined. Id at 576. The terms of both types of treaties are suffi-
ciently elastic to accommodate United States restrictions against all foreign investment.
88. Treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation that incorporate the principle
of national treatment are most problematic. Under this principle, the Federal Govern-
ment may not impose restrictions on the nationals of the other party to the treaty that are
stricter than those it imposes on American nationals. Id at 569. Some of these treaties,
however, may not prescribe national treatment for investment activities by foreigners.
Id at 573-74. Moreover, the protocols accompanying others in this group of treaties may
permit exceptions to the principle of national treatment in the case of controls on foreign
investment. Id at 571-72. In addition, the treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion contain escape clauses that authorize activities necessary to protect essential security
interests. Id at 591. These clauses might provide a basis for exception to national treat-
ment. Id at 591. Finally, the United States can renegotiate or terminate, if necessary,
those treaties whose guarantee of national treatment proves a bar to restrictions on for-
eign investment. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 38; Note, supra note 56, at 588-
89.
Admittedly, controls on foreign investment would violate the spirit of many United
States treaty obligations. Nevertheless, none of the United States' partners in these trea-
ties has matched the United States commitment to unrestricted foreign investment. H.R.
REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 48-55; see also Note, supra note 56, at 580-88. If the
spirit of these treaties can tolerate other nations' restrictions, reasonable measures by the
United States should, likewise, be acceptable.
89. If the United States-the primary "keeper of the faith" for an open interna-
tional economic system-were to appear to be moving down the road toward
restrictions, this would have a major corrosive effect on other countries and tend
to legitimize current and new interventions in international investment on their
part.
1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 66 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secre-
tary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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terns of behavior for other countries. 90 Moreover, the United States'
consistent advocacy of free market principles generally has not pre-
vented changing economic conditions from eroding the once cooper-
ative atmosphere in the world economy.9' In response to these
changing conditions, many nations are reexamining their policies
toward foreign investment. 92 The United States should be no less
responsive to a changing world economic environment. 93
90. Contrary to the United States' example, the rest of the world has adopted a
restrictive approach toward foreign investment. See infra notes 95-102 and accompany-
ing text. United States policy apparently failed to persuade other countries to relax their
foreign investment restraints. Thus, there does not appear to be any reason for those
countries to adopt more stringent policies in response to the United States establishing a
policy comparable to the milder among those employed by United States trading
partners.
91. The staggering jump in the cost of energy and the endless turmoil in the
international money markets have wrenched the global economy loose from its
postwar moorings and forced it to head into totally unknown waters in the
1980s ....
...Three decades of open, free trade that permitted the multinationals to
blossom are giving way to a period of neo-mercantilism .... So the coopera-
tive effort to create an interdependent world economy-a hallmark of the post-
war period-is being replaced by what often appears to be a free-for-all among
industrial nations trying to grab or preserve as much as possible for themselves
of the shrinking economic pie.
Bus. WK., July 9, 1979, at 50, 50.
92. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 148-57; 1974 Hearings, supra note 67, at
375, 375-467, reprinting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d CoNo., 2d
SESS., INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1974)
(J. Sanford and J. Costa).
93. For one recommendation for a new United States domestic policy on foreign
direct investment, see supra notes 125-37 and accompanying test.
The United States employs three general methods to implement its foreign policy on
international ivestment: bilateral accords, multilateral accords, and unilateral action.
Bilateral agreements in the form of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation have
had only limited success. See supra note 88. As noted, the United States subscribes to
the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements. Supra note 62. Nevertheless,
"[e]ven the OECD Code has fallen into disuse, its escape and derogation clauses being
invoked widely by many members." Note, supra note 13, at 627.
A more recent multilateral effort concerning, among other things, national treatment
and international investment incentives and disincentives is the OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. 21(76)04/1 (1976), reprinted in
OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7 (1976), and
in 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 83 (1976). A related OECD decision authorizes, among other
things, consultations on international investment. OECD, supra, at 73, 75 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 88 (1976), both reprinting Decision of the Council on International Investment
Incentives and Disincentives. The Declaration and the Decision have three main ele-
ments with respect to international investment: first, participating member countries
commit themselves "to give due weight to the interests of Member countries affected by
specific laws, regulations and administrative practices in this field (hereinafter called
'measures') providing official incentives and disincentives to international direct invest-
ment," 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 83, 83; second, participating member countries commit them-
selves to' "endeavour to make such measures as transparent as possible, so that their
importance and purpose can be ascertained and that information on them can be readily
available," id; and third, provision for consultations "at the request of a Member coun-
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Another rationale for maintaining the open door policy is the
fear that if the United States imposes resrictions, foreign countries
will retaliate against United States investors. 94 As the world's largest
exporter of investment capital, the United States is vulnerable to the
imposition of restrictions on foreign investment. The possibility of
retaliation, however, is exaggerated. Most United States investors
abroad are already subject to registration and screening require-
ments, and must meet certain conditions for entry.95 Latin Ameri-
can countries, for instance, generally require the registration and
authorization of foreign investments, 96 and designate a govemmen-
try which considers that its interests may be adversely affected by the impact on its flow
of international direct investments of measures taken by another Member country specif-
ically designed to provide incentives or disincentives for international direct investment,"
id at 88. 1979 OECD REviEw, supra note 13, at 55. The Turkish Government did not
participate in the Declaration and abstained from the decision. OECD, supra, at 9 n.
(1976).
The Declaration also states that member countries should, "consistent with their needs
to maintain public order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfill commit-
ments relating to international peace and security," accord national treatment to foreign-
controlled enterprises after their establishment. 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 83. In contrast, the
1961 OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, supra note 62, does not refer
to the treatment of foreign-controlled enterprises after their establishment. 1979 OECD
REviEw, supra note 13, at 46. Finally, the Declaration expressly "does not deal with the
right of Member countries to regulate the entry of foreign investment or the condition of
establishment of foreign enterprises." 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 83, 83 (1976).
It is perhaps too soon to assess the Declaration's success in liberalizing or retarding the
growth of restrictions on international investment. The 1979 ministerial review of the
Declaration observed "a growing risk of increased competition in the use of investment
incentives by governments." 1979 OECD REviEw, supra note 13, at 56. The United
States Government has already expressed its dissatisfaction with the efficacy of the Dec-
laration: "'Over the past 3 years, the United States has been disappointed in the inabil-
ity of OECD member governments to deal effectively with the issue of investment
incentives and disincentives." DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1979, at 41, 41, reprinting U.S.
Department of State, Press Release No. 181 (July 27, 1979).
Finally, Mr. Bergsten intimates, supra note 89, that the United States Government
intends that its domestic policy on foreign investment within the country should influ-
ence international economic policy. One might describe this as a species of unilateral
action. The United States' mere example, however, seemiis ineffective in an era of deterio-
rating economic cooperation among the industrialized nations of the West and Japan.
See, e.g., supra note 90. Instead, foreign governments and their nationals are free to
exploit investment opportunities in the United States without providing comparable
access to their home markets to United States investors. Moreover, United States inves-
tors abroad must demonstrate benefits to the host country, while even the least desirable
foreign investment finds a receptive host in the United States. This inequity is particu-
larly acute when the foreign investor is a government-controlled or -owned enterprise.
For instance, the United States permits the government-controlled British Petroleum
Company to mine in United States territory, even though United States firms may not do
the same in Great Britain. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 23 (testimony of Profes-
sor Douglas F. Lamont). For a description of the British Petroleum Company's activities
in the United States, see Bus. WK., April 27, 1981, at 42; id, May 8, 1978, at 76.
94. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 37.
95. Id
96. PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, supra note 85, at 41-123,
126.
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tal agency with a variety of powers to oversee foreign investment. 97
More importantly, the leading industrialized countries in the West
and Japan98 generally have some form of compulsory reporting for
foreign investment,99 limit foreign investment in broad sectors of the
economy, 100 and discriminate against acquisitions by foreign inves-
tors.' 0 ' At least seven of the United States' major trading partners
have some form of review for foreign investment, 10 2 ranging from
informal review to regular screening. 0 3 In short, the rest of the
world already restricts foreign investment, and, consequently, it is
unlikely that comparable restrictions by the United States would
provoke retaliatory actions by other countries.
Finally, United States policymakers believe that any limitation
of foreign direct investment will discourage foreign investors, caus-
ing the loss of beneficial inflows of investment capital. '4 This belief
is part of a larger, and perhaps the central objection to any change in
the open door policy. As a matter of general economic policy and
theory, defenders of the open door policy do not want to interfere
with the efficient market allocation of scarce resources, 10 5 even
though they recognize that some foreign investments are undesir-
able.10 6 The international market for investment capital is now
responding to the investment policy initiatives of foreign govern-
ments more than ever before.107 Moreover, under the open door pol-
97. Id at 41-126.
98. This information is from a Department of Commerce study that examined the
treatment of foreign investment in Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Japan. 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, supra note 23, app. N, at N-2.
99. Id at N-2.
100. Id at N-I.
101. Id.
102. Id. at N-6 to -12 (France), N-17 to -19 (West Germany), N-23 to -28 (Italy), N-32
to -36 (the Netherlands), N-46 to -51 (the United Kingdom), N-57 to -65 (Canada), N-68
to -76 (Japan).
103. Canada, France, and Japan have formal screening procedures. Id at N-I, N-6 to
-12, N-57 to -65, N-68 to -76.
104. "The establishment of new authority by law.., to block foreign investments
would be highly visible to potential investors in the United States, and would be taken as
a sign that our nation is changing its basic and traditional attitude toward such invest-
ment." 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 65 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
105. See, e.g., supra note 78; U.S. PRESIDENT, supra note 65, at 43.
Foreign direct investment is sometimes called a win-win situation. See, e.g., King,
supra note 50, at 6. Even though a particular foreign direct investment may not benefit
the host country, international investment augments the wealth of the world generally,
because investors presumably employ their capital in the most profitable fashion possi-
ble. This is what United States policymakers mean by efficient resource allocation. See
generally supra note 83.
106. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 60 (testimony of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
107. See infra note 136.
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icy, foreign investors need not concern themselves with the so-called
spillover costs and benefits of foreign direct investment, those costs
and benefits that affect society but not the investor.'0 8 If, from
among equally desirable investment options, a foreign investor fails
to select the investment with the most desirable spillover result, 0 9
then the market will have allocated resources in a fashion that is less
efficient than theoretically possible." 0 On the other hand, even if
each of the foreign investor's options will yield the same spillover
result, the open door policy fails to consider whether the interna-
tional and domestic distribution of these spillover costs and benefits
is equitable.Y' Note that a policy that brings about an equitable
distribution of spillover costs and benefits need by no means reject
the private market's allocation of scarce resources. For instance, a
governmental agency enforcing such a policy need not purport to tell
prospective foreign investors what investment option would be most
profitable and insist that they select that option or none at all. If the
agency did sometimes refuse to approve a proposed foreign invest-
ment under a new policy, it would, of course, affect the private mar-
ket's allocation of resources. The agency would do so, however, only
where the spillover costs outweighed the spillover benefits, or the net
benefits to the foreign investor, or both. This sort of interference
108. See supra notes 21-60 and accompanying text.
Discussion of foreign direct investment frequently employs the term spillover costs and
benefits. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 60 (testimony of C. Fred Berg-
sten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury);
King, supra note 50, at 4-5. Here the term refers to any cost of foreign direct investment
that the associated foreign investor does not incur, and to any benefit of foreign direct
investment that the associated foreign investor does not reap.
This definition is synonymous with what economists conventionally call externalities.
See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 83, at 474. The term spillover costs and benefits
may be broader, however. Economists attempt to identify external costs, for instance,
because they can enhance the efficiency of resource allocation by making the relevant
decisionmaker take these costs into account. The problem of pollution is a familiar
example. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 83, at 373-81. If the economist's externali-
ties refer only to those external costs and benefits the manipulation of which can enhance
the efficiency of resource allocation, then the term spillover costs and benefits is broader
in meaning. The latter term also refers to costs and benefits that have nothing to do with
the efficiency of resource allocation. For instance, when a foreign investor constructs a
new plant, the host country reaps the spillover benefit of new jobs. Government cannot,
however, enhance the efficiency of resource allocation by bringing this sort of considera-
tion to bear on the foreign investor's selection of a plant site. Instead, whether one coun-
try or another reaps the new jobs is a matter of distribution.
109. In the sense of an externality. See supra note 108.
110. Such an external diseconomy arises when a foreigner uses a direct investment as
a vehicle to transfer technology abroad without compensating those who paid to develop
this technology.
111. Distributive schemes do not purport to increase wealth; instead, they concern
win-lose situations. Compare supra note 105. For instance, if one host country wins the
jobs that new plant construction creates, another possible host country loses these jobs.
No redistribution of these jobs among countries will produce greater wealth, rather, the
matter is simply one of fairness. See generally supra note 83.
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with the market's allocation is desirable. Consequently, the objec-
tions to policies designed to distribute the spillover costs and benefits
or to enhance the efficiency of the market's allocation frequently
appear to amount to an assertion that governmental regulation
would be too burdensome, too costly, or ineffective. 112 Without
experience, however, one cannot assess the truth of this assertion.
There remains, however, another difficulty. If, in response to
purely domestic concerns, the Federal Government were officially to
recognize that sound policy on foreign direct investment must at the
least accommodate both the market allocation of resources and the
distribution of spillover costs and benefits, then the United States
could not consistently advocate one goal without also advocating the
other. In this sense, the United States would perhaps dilute the rig-
orous purity of its earlier position. The time has come, however, for
the United States to recognize that the practice of other nations, if
not their words, demonstrates that fewer and fewer nations subscribe
to a rigorous open door policy for international investment.1 13 Such
a recognition would not require the United States to abandon inter-
national investment as an essential component of the free market
world economy that the United States still seeks to erect. Indeed, in
the long run, the United States might have greater success in the
international arena if it were to distinguish among desirable and
undesirable types of restrictions on foreign investment,1 14 instead of
simply insisting upon an unrealistic policy of neutrality that many
foreign countries can no longer uphold.
III. THE UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Members of Congress have sponsored a wide spectrum of bills,
ranging from absolute bans on foreign investments to more moder-
ate proposals that would leave present policy largely unchanged. 115
112. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 59-60 (testimony of C. Fred Berg-
sten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
113. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
114. For instance, the practice of most Western industrialized nations accords national
treatment to foreign direct investments after their establishment. 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, supra note 44, app. N, at N-I. The recent OECD Declaration on International
In.'estment and Multinational Enterprises gives explicit recognition to this principle. See
supra note 93.
115. From the first session of the ninety-third Congress to the second session of the
ninety-fifth Congress, for instance, Members of Congress introduced more than 80 differ-
ent bills concerning foreign investment. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 11 (testi-
mony of Professor Jeffrey S. Arpan). For a discussion of a number of these bills, see
Note, supra note 63, at 634-46. The commentator identifies at least five general types of
proposed legislation. One proposal would flatly prohibit foreign investment under cer-
tain conditions, usually a certain monetary amount or specified percentage of ownership.
Another type proposes selective screening before a prospective investor makes an invest-
ment. A third type proposes proforma screening, ie., a reporting requirement with a
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House bill 7750116 proposed reciprocal limitations on foreign invest-
ment. The bill would have amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934117 to make it unlawful for a foreign corporation to acquire the
beneficial ownership of equity securities, "18 "unless the laws and reg-
ulations of the country in which such person is incorporated are no
more restrictive than the provisions of this title and other Federal
law with respect to the acquisition, by a person incorporated in a
State of the United States, of a like amount of equity securities
issued by a person incorporated in such foreign country."' "19
The bill adopted the quid pro quo approach to foreign direct
investment. This approach has two purposes. First, it remedies the
fundamental inequity of the open door policy that allows foreign
investors unimpeded access to the United States, even though the
home countries of these investors would place substantial restrictions
on the activities of United States investors.120 Second, this approach
retains the present policy's goal of encouraging other nations to
remove restrictions on inflows of investment capital, 121 but it rejects
the purely multilateral tendency that characterized United States
policy in the 1970's122 in favor of unilateral action. This approach
presumes that other countries will lower or remove restrictions on
foreign investment in order to obtain comparable investment privi-
leges for their nationals in the United States.
The success of House bill 7750 and similar bills adopting the
quid pro quo approach would depend on the response they evoke
abroad. This approach assumes either that the prospect of greater
investment privileges in the United States is sufficiently enticing to
cause other countries to lift their foreign investment restrictions, or
that other countries can and are willing to accord United States
investors treatment different from that given to other foreign inves-
tors. Moreover, because each nation's response would depend on its
policies toward both inflows and outflows of investment capital, the
provision for closer scrutiny, if certain circumstances arise. A fourth type would provide
for monitoring after a foreign investor has made an investment. A final category simply
proposes reporting requirements. Id at 634-35.
116. H.R. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess (1980). For the full text of the bill, see supra note
10.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77c, 77j-77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78d, 78e-781, 78m-78o, 78o-3 to
78hh, 78ii-78jj (1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(15), 77c(a)(2), (6)-(7), (9)-(10), (b),
77(d)(6), 77s(c), 78c(a)(12), (40), 78k(a)(3), 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78o(d), 78u(g), 78ff
(Supp. IV. 1980).
118. The bill followed the definition of equity securities in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(Supp. IV 1980).
119. H.R. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
120. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 89 & 93.
122. See supra note 89.
FOPEIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
international reaction is difficult to predict. The quid pro quo
approach assumes that other countries generally favor outflows of
investment capital, and that this preference outweighs any resistance
to inflows of investment capital. This assumption, however, is prob-
lematic. Not all countries encourage outflows of investment capi-
tal;123 for example, developing countries want to keep investment
capital at home. 124 For such countries, the quid pro quo approach
offers little or no inducement to lower restrictions on inflows of
investment capital because the prospect of greater investment privi-
leges abroad is not appealing. If the United States were to match
restrictiveness with restrictiveness, the approach would result in an
overall increase in restrictions on foreign investment.
The major drawback of the quid pro quo approach is its failure
to discriminate among prospective investments on the basis of their
merits. Identical investments originating in different countries
would receive disparate treatment. If a foreigner proposes a highly
beneficial investment, but comes from a country with a restrictive
policy on inflows of investment capital, the quid pro quo approach
would reject the proposed investment, and the United States would
have to forego the spillover benefits.
An alternative to the present policy and the quid pro quo
approach of House bill 7750 is a case by case screening procedure for
inflows of investment capital. Other industrialized countries have
instituted such procedures. 125 In general, an agency uses a screening
procedure to determine the net economic and political effect of a
prospective foreign investment on the host country. With this infor-
mation, the agency can approve, reject, or seek modification of a
proposal.
Canada, for example, adopted the Foreign Investment Review
Act 26 in 1973. Under the Act, Canada scrutinizes the proposed
investments of noneligible persons 2 7 (foreigners) under a test that
123. See generally 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, app. N, at N-3 to -4, N-
8, N-26 to -27, N-32 to -34, N-40, N-46 to -48, N-69 to -70.
124. E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
CoUNTRIES, 18-21 (1965); see generally id at 2-4.
125. Canada is one such nation. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. Aus-
tralia, Brazil, France, Mexico, and West Germany, among others, have also instituted
measures for reviewing foreign investments. King, supra note 50, at 44-62.
126. 1973-1974 Can. Stat. ch. 46, amended by 1976-1977 Can. Stat. ch. 52, s. 128(2).
For a thorough discussion of the history and provisions of the Act, see G. HUGHES,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT (1975). The Act is a statute of the Parliament of
Canada and received Royal Assent on December 12, 1973. 109 Can. Gaz. 2477 (1975).
It came into force on April 9, 1974, -with respect to takeovers, 108 id at 1533 (1974), on
October 15, 1975, with respect to new businesses, 109 id at 2477 (1975).
127. The Act defines a noneligible person as follows:
(a) an individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident
within the meaning of the Immigration Act, 1976 and includes
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attempts to determine whether an investment will be of "significant
benefit '1 28 to Canada. The Act employs a bargaining paradigm' 29 -
in return for the opportunity to invest in Canada, the responsible
officials seek concessions from the prospective foreign investor. 30
Such concessions might include an agreement to buy more Canadian
goods, or an agreement to sell a portion of a proposed Canadian
affiliate to Canadian nationals within a specified period of time.
These commitments ensure that Canada will obtain a net economic
gain from inflows of investment capital. Canada. approves roughly
ninety percent of the applications submitted.' 3'
The international reaction to the Canadian screening procedure
is unclear. Although some individual decisions have elicited protests
(i) a Canadian citizen who is not ordinarily resident in Cabada and who is
a member of a class of persons prescribed by regulation for the purpose of
this definition, and
(ii) a permanent resident who has been ordinarily resident in Canada for
more than one year after the time at which he first became eligible to apply
for Canadian citizenship,
(b) the government of a country other than Canada or of a political subdivision
of a country other than Canada, or an agency of such a government, or
(c) a corporation incorporated in Canada or elsewhere that is controlled in any
manner that results in control in fact, whether directly through the ownership of
shares or indirectly through a trust, a contract, the ownership of shares of any
other corporation or otherwise, by a person described in paragraph (a) or (b) or
by a group of persons any member of which is a person described in paragraph
(a) or (b) ....
1973-1974 Can. Stat. ch. 46, s. 3(1), amendedby 1976-1977 Can. Stat. ch. 52, s. 128(2); see
generally G. HUGHES, supra note 126, at 16-23.
128. 1973-1974 Can. Stat. ch. 46, s. 2(2). The Act establishes five factors for assessing
whether a proposed foreign investment will be of significant benefit to Canada:
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of
economic activity in Canada, including without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of
parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on exports from
Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business
enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which
the business enterprise or new business forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial effi-
ciency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in
Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any
industry or industries in Canada; and"
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national indus-
trial and economic policies taking into consideration industrial and economic
policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province
likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment.
Id; see generally G. HUGHES, supra note 126, at 53-60.
129. Id at 2, 61, 63, 67-70, 72.
130. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 6, 10 (statement and testimony of Pro-
fessor William S. Barnes); see generally Barnes, supra note 85.
131. 1979 Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 8, 10 (testimony of Professor William S.
Barnes); 9 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, app. N, at N-63.
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from the investors concerned, there is no evidence that other coun-
tries have retaliated against Canadian investors abroad.1 32 More-
over, United States investors have steadily expanded their
investments in Canada since the inception of the screening proce-
dure. 33 Thus, from a Candian standpoint, the screening process is
successful: without significantly reducing the inflow of investment
capital, the Foreign Investment Review Act has ensured that foreign
direct investment benefits Canada. 34
The case by case consideration makes sense in the context of
foreign direct investment because the desirability of each investment
depends on its particular characteristics. 35 Through negotiation, the
responsible officials and the prospective investor may be able to
reduce the detrimental aspects of a proposed investment. Legislation
can also empower the screening agency to insulate key sectors of the
economy from foreign direct investment. Moreover, a screening
agency can encourage particularly beneficial projects by selectively
132. Until 1979, Canada administered the screening process liberally and evenhand-
edly in all areas of foreign investment. See NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 63. There is no
evidence that Canada's administration of the screening procedure before 1979 drew offi-
cial objections or retaliatory action from other countries. More recently, however,
Canada has sought to raise the level of Canadian ownership in the country's oil and gas
industry. Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1980, at 126, 126, 128, 131. Increasingly, Canada uses the
screening procedure to effect this goal. NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 63, 63; Bus. WK.,
Oct. 6, 1980, at 126, 131. This use of the screening procedure has provoked complaints
from United States companies with holdings in Canada's energy sector, who claim that
restrictions on sales to other foreigners are depressing the value of their investments.
NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 63. In response to these complaints, some discussed the
possibility of retaliatory action, but the United States has taken no steps in that direction.
Id; Bus. WK., June 8, 1981, at 146. Thus, it appears that the United States business
community objects not so much to the screening procedure itself, but to the particular
and heavyhanded way Canada has applied the procedure to foreign investment in the
energy sector. Nevertheless, because of an alleged concern over the screening procedure
generally, President Reagan recently decided to seek talks with Canada under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1982, at D2, col. 4.
133. Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1980, at 126.
134. A partner at a major Toronto law firm now advises his foreign clients to "'make
share offerings to increase Canadian ownership, develop a board with Canadian mem-
bers--and talk to FIRA [Foreign Investment Review Agency], to try to get recognized by
it as a Canadian company."' Id at 131, quoting Peter R. Hayden. This advice, to
increase Canadian ownership and participation in foreign-owned industry, accords with
the objectives of the Act. See supra note 128.
135.
The reasons leading Canada to introduce a review process could well be applied
to other host countries even though they are not experiencing the same degree of
foreign presence or predominance: first, that foreign investment has a role to
play in future economic development where it contributes to realizing national
industrial objectives; second, that special measures to deal with certain pi6blems
will be required no matter how rosy the picture in the future; third, that costs and
benefits of foreign direct investment vary from industry-to-industry and from
case-to-case, thereby requiring, flexibility rather than fixed rules; fourth, that
good performance is more important than local ownership and control of a firm.
Barnes, supra note 85, at 4 (footnotes omitted).
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applying investment incentives in the form of tax reductions, acceler-
ated depreciation schedules, or low interest loans. 136 Foreigners who
invest in economically depressed areas, declining industries, or
industrial research may be appropriate recipients of such incentives.
Finally, a screening procedure creates a current and accurate source
of information on foreign direct investment.
Congress should consider establishing a screening agency pat-
terned after those of similarly situated countries. This agency should
be empowered to review potential investments with an eye toward
significant benefit to the United States. 137 The agency should
attempt to bargain away the harmful effects of proposed investments.
The agency should also have the authority to bar investments, if
negotiation cannot alleviate the detrimental aspects.
The agency's criteria for screening should address the concerns
about foreign direct investment identified above. Thus, the agency
might ask the following questions: first, to what extent will the pro-
spective investor use domestic funds to finance the proposed invest-
ment; second, what plan does the applicant have for the profits of his
investment; third, to what extent will the proposed investment utilize
imported goods; fourth, does the applicant aim to secure either
scarce natural resources or innovative United States technology; and
fifth, will the proposed investment involve the acquisition of an
already established enterprise. Finally, the agency should use invest-
ment incentives to encourage investments in geographic areas or eco-
nomic sectors that lack sufficient sources of investment capital.
CONCLUSION
The United States should adapt its policy on foreign direct
investment to changes in the country's and the world's economic sit-
uation. The open door policy served the interests of the United
136. Most other industrialized nations currently offer investment incentives. 9 U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, app. N, at N-2; see, e.g., id at N-2, N-4 to -5, N-7,
N-12 to -13, N-16 to -17, N-19 to -20, N-29, N-32 to -33, N-37, N-51 to -53, N-65.
137. An alternative to the creation of a new administrative agency is to endow the
existing Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States with additional author-
ity. Seesupra note 71. The Committee is a high level interagency committee run by the
Treasury Department. H.R. REP. No. 1216, supra note 19, at 22. It has three responsibil-
ities: first, to set priorities on Federal data collection and research and analytical efforts
concerning foreign direct investment; second, to formulate policy on foreign direct
investment through reassessments and recommendations to the President; and, third, to
examine actual investments that have major implications for United States national
interests. Id Currently, the Committee is nearly dormant. It has met only 10 times in
the last five years and has reviewed only three actual cases of foreign direct investment.
Id With a change in leadership and a legislative mandate, however, Congress might
employ the existing administrative structure of the Committee as a screening agency for
foreign direct investment.
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States well when Americans had no reason to concern themselves
with the harmful effects of foreign direct investment. Today, how-
ever, the open door policy offers inadequate protection for the polit-
ical and economic interests of the United States. The country needs
a new policy that reduces the costs and augments the benefits of for-
eign direct investment.
Congress faces a range of policy options for foreign direct
investment. Congress should reject House bill 7750 and similar pro-
posals adopting the quid pro quo approach because they fail to dis-
tinguish among investments on the basis of individual merit. By
contrast, a case by case screening procedure would serve that func-
tion. The case by case screening of foreign direct investment would
permit the United States to participate in the international exchange
of investment capital without unnecessarily exposing itself to the
costs of such investment.
Carolyn .J Kubota
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